British leaders were constantly angered, from the 1840s to 1860s, by what they saw as Washington`s pandering to the democratic crowd, as in the border conflict between 1844 and 1846 in Oregon. However, public opinion of the British middle class felt a „special relationship“ between the two peoples, based on language, migration, evangelical Protestantism, liberal traditions and extensive trade. This constituency refused the war and forced London to coax the Americans. In the Trent affair at the end of 1861, London made the border and Washington withdrew.  Coolidge was impressed by the success of the 1921/22 Washington Naval Conference and convened the second international conference on naval issues in 1927, in particular to limit the number of warships of less than 10,000 tons. The conference was held in Geneva. It failed because France refused to participate, and most of the delegates were admirals who did not want to limit their fleets.  Coolidge listened to his own admirals, but President Hoover did not and concluded a maritime agreement with Great Britain in 1930.  In 1929, a second summit was held in the United States between President Herbert Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.
Both men were seriously dedicated to peace and the meeting went smoothly in discussions on the limitation of maritime weapons and the implementation of the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact. One of the results was the 1930 London Naval Treaty, which continued the restrictions imposed on warships among the great powers, which were first established in 1922.  On November 17, 1938, after four years of discussion and manoeuvring, Britain, the United States and Canada signed two large-scale and interdependent trade agreements. Some major elements dominated the conversations. The Americans wanted to break the walls of the British imperial preference system. The British sought markets and political support in the United Kingdom and the Baltics, while protecting their local agriculture and improving political relations with the United States. Canada, whose tolerance and cooperation were needed through the existing network of trade agreements, hoped to attract new export markets, preserve the old one and achieve international political calm through economic means. Although negotiations began with a mixture of sublime and shameful motives, they eventually dominated. 32 For this argument, see Reynolds (fn. 24), 9.
N. D.D. Dilks argues that „the desire to save time … a considerable role“ in chamberlain`s belief that he was appeased. „The Germans… We are too aware of their strength and weakness, and until we are as strong as they are, we will always be locked in this state of chronic fear,“ Chamberlain wrote to his sister in 1938. Dilks (fn. 24), 43. Maurice Cowling argues that „to what extent and at what time Chamberlain believed he had a mission to prevent war, how far and when his policy was tactical, must be enthrlyed for Daser.“ Cowling, , The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar 11 If preferential rates are reciprocal, certain rates of tariff reductions will improve the terms of exchange between the two parties relative to the rest of the world. Thus, both parties improve their terms of trade when tariffs are reduced to avoid any change in the terms and conditions between them.
These conclusions follow, considering that initial tariffs are low, tariff reductions are low and all exports are gross substitutes for global consumption. To discuss why these assumptions are necessary, see Mundell (fn. 9). The thirteen colonies gradually gained more autonomy.  British mercantilist policy became stricter, which benefited the metropolis, resulting in trade restrictions, limiting the growth of the colonial economy and artificially reducing the income potential of colonial traders.